How much innovation will be needed to meet the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals? We model shifts in the cross-country relationship between GDP per capita and achievement in key development indicators as "technological gains" and convergence to the best performers at a given income as "policy gains." Assuming that the United Nations' income growth projections for low-and middle-income countries are met, we estimate the residual demand for technology and policy innovation needed to meet several critical targets of the SDGs. Our results suggest that (i) best performers are considerably outperforming the average performance at a given income level, suggesting considerable progress could be achieved through policy change but that (ii) the targets set in the SDGs are unlikely to be met by 2030 without very rapid, ubiquitous technological progress alongside economic growth.
Introduction
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)development targets for United Nations member states over the next 15 yearsare very ambitious. The world has achieved signicant progress towards improving the human condition over the past several decades. More children than ever are being educated. Fewer people are living in extreme poverty than ever before.
And across the globe, people are living healthier, more free lives. But the progress demanded by the SDGs is more rapid than this historical precedent. and what are the biggest obstacles ahead? We oer an empirical estimate of the demand for innovation following in the steps of Samuel Preston's landmark paper (Preston, 1975) . Applying Preston's principles from life expectancy to a variety of key indicators, we model the relationship between each development goal and a country's income level. We take the movement along the curve produced by a seven percent rate of GDP growth as given and project shifts in the curve over time to predict outcomes in 2030 and compare with SDG targets. We also look at best performance at given income levels to examine how much progress would be achieved if all countries reached best performance standards for their projected income per capita in 2030, then allow for progress in best performance at a given income based on past improvement in best performance at a given income over time.
We dene technology and technology requirement here both broadly and partially. It is anything that allows an improved outcome at a given level of income across all countries. This might be driven by traditional technological inventiona cheap and eective vaccine against malaria, for example. But it might just as well be driven by a widely adopted institutional change that increases the eciency of spending, a widespread shift in spending priorities or outside support. And for some variables we measure (the number of women in parliament, for example), it is likely that traditional technologies play a small (direct) role.
1
Note also that our denition of technology excludes changes that both improve outcomes and income. Take the malaria vaccine again: this may have a dramatic impact on health but through that channel may well increase productivity. Our technology requirement measure would only include the impact on health of the malaria vaccine above and beyond the health improvement expected because of income change and the move along a given Preston curve.
Similarly we dene policy improvement as moving towards best or frontier performance the best outcome achieved by any country at a given income. As measured, this may involve policy choices (potentially those that trade o against delivering other SDGs.) But the performance might also reect geographic or other factors only somewhat inuenced by policy, a technology that is not widely adopted, and/or outlier measurement error.
For many of the 169 SDG targets that were adopted by the UN General Assembly, it is impossible to know denitively whether the target is actually met. We focus on SDGs that meet three criteria. First, the indicators must be quantitatively measurable. Second, the targets must be explicit.
1 Third, there must be a sucient breadth of available data in terms of the span of years with at least 50 country observations. This reduces the list of targets to those listed below. The resulting set covers 11 targets across 6 of the 17 goals.
• Goal 3: Reduce maternal mortality to under 70 per 100,000 by 2030. Reduce neonatal mortality under 12 per 1,000 by 2030. Reduce under-ve mortality to 25 per 1,000 live births.
• Goal 4: Provide primary and secondary education for all by 2030. Achieve gender parity at primary, secondary, and tertiary education levels by 2030.
• Goal 5: Achieve gender parity in the proportion of seats in national parliaments.
• Goal 6: Provide access to clean water and adequate sanitation by 2030.
• Goal 7: Provide universal electricity access by 2030.
• Goal 9: Double industry share of GDP in least developed countries by 2030. Given the state of some of these indicators around the world today, such as the under-ve mortality rate shown in gure 1, achieving the SDGs in the next 13 years is certainly an ambitious task.
Previous analyses of the demands necessary to meet the SDGs have largely focused on nancing requirements built up from unit costs of meeting various goals. Such exercises include Stenberg et al. (2016) , Hutton and Varughese (2016) , Chongcharoentanawat et al. (2016) , Greenhill et al. (2015) , and United Nations General Assembly (2014). Clemens et al. (2007) criticized a similar literature that set out to cost the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals, noting that progress in meeting MDG targets required more than money.
Previous projection eorts around the SDGs include Karver et al. (2012) , Nicolai et al. (2015) , Lange and Klasen (2015) . These papers have used past rates of individual country progress on individual SDG targets to forecast plausible future progress. Our paper builds on this body of work in several ways. First, we oer a historical analysis at how the relationship between key development outcomes and income has evolved over time from the perspective of technological growth. While previous estimates have focused primarily on health outcomes, we oer comparable estimates for a variety of other key sectors. Second, we study best or frontier performancewhat is theoretically achievable at a given income as demonstrated by countries providing the best outcomes at or below that given income. Third, we provide empirical estimates of the feasibility of achieving the SDGs. This allows us to quantify the demand for technology and/or policy change for each indicator. Given our broad denition of technology and policy, of course, any conclusions will have to be drawn with caution. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our empirical strategy, and section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 present the results, and section 5 discusses implications for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Section 6 concludes.
Two Projection Models for Predicting Performance
In order to predict future progress in these key indicators, we adopt two sets of projections: the traditional Preston curve and a best performer model that we call the technological frontier. For both models, we use historical performance data from starting year s to ending year e in order to forecast future estimates for each SDG indicator I in country i ∈ C and year y. In order to ensure that the relationships are robust, we set a minimum standard for the number of non-missing observations per year. Thus for each indicator I, the period (s, e) is dened as the earliest and latest years for which there is a xed sample of at least 50 countries in both years with non-missing data.
2 Table 1 lists this period for each indicator. We always assume that GDP growth in the future will meet the SDG target of 7 percent such that for every year after the observed period end e, the GDP is dened as GDP i,e+t = GDP i,e * 1.07
t . This provides the key exogenous driver of progress in our projections. This growth rate is the explicit goal stated in the SDGs for low-and middle-income countries. We will see that this itself is a hugely ambitious target, and it is unlikely that this will be met consistently for all countries. Thus in some ways, these predictions provide 2 The exception to this rule is CO 2 KT per GDP PPP Constant 2011. There is sucient data under these conditions back to 1960. However, given the rapid developments in emissions technology recently, the rst year s is set to 2000. 4 a lower bound on the demand for technology and policy.
Preston Curves
Our rst results will be based on a model that predicts outcomes using the improvement expected from movement along the contemporary Preston curve implied by a seven percent income growth rate to 2030. Then we will model improvement expected from a seven percent annual income growth rate along a Preston curve shifted on the basis of past evolution of the cross-country relationship between incomes and outcomes. Equation 1 models the shifting Preston curve. We assume that a shift in the Preston curve signies technological progress: i.e. that for a given GDP per capita, a better development outcome over time is due solely to technology (broadly dened.) There are several key assumptions inherent in this specication. First, we assume that the functional form of the Preston curve relationship is constant over countries and over time. Second, we follow Pritchett and Viarengo (2010) and assume a double log relationship between income and each SDG goal. In Equation 1, average annual technological growth over the period with starting year s and ending year e is modeled by the parameters (α s,e ,β s,e ). Given the simple Preston curve ln(I i,y ) = α y +β y * ln The structure is identical forβ. Third, we assume that when we estimate the marginal increase in innovation that will be needed in our base specication, the technological progress of the last period will continue during the next period. Formally, we assume (α s,e ,β s,e ) = (α e,e+t ,β e,e+t ) ∀t. Figure 2 shows a visualization of these projected shifts. Finally, we assume that no country will become worse o than it is todaythat is, we force I i,y to be at least as good as I i,e .
ln(I i,y ) = α e +α s,e * (y − e) + (β e +β s,e * (y − e)) * ln(
The inclusion of the residual i,e i can be interpreted as allowing for a version of country xed eects. The subscript e i designates that this residual is taken for the last year for which data for each specic country is available, even if there is data available in more recent years for other countries. This residual is calculated based o a predicted value using all countries with non-missing data for that year (not the xed sample specication). For countries with no data for a particular indicator, forecast values are on the Preston curve (i.e. the residual is assumed to be zero). The residuals i,e i are in themselves interesting, highlighting which countries perform particularly well or particularly poorly given their income. Figure 14 shows that Europe, parts of East Asia, and East Africa perform better than would be expected in terms of under-ve mortality given their GDP per capita while the Middle East, Southern and Eastern Africa, and Latin America perform worse. This specication therefore assumes that lead and laggard countries in terms of out-or under-performing on an outcome at a given level of income remain lead or laggard countries to the same extent into the future.
Given heteroskedacticity in the Preston curves and higher residuals at low income levels, this likely produces a conservative prediction of outcomes as countries grow over time. We modify the sample of countries used in the base regression to calculate α,β based on a xed sample of countriesthat is, we restrict all regressions to only include those countries for which we have data in year s. Historical data availability is not exogenous (favoring wealthy countries and those that have prioritized data collection). Transitions in Preston curves using all available data in a given year might misattribute a shift to technology when in fact it is non-random changes to the sample. This leaves us with four specications in a 2 × 2 matrix: combinations of no shift in the current Preston curve versus assuming technological progress continues at historical rates and including residuals or not.
Policy Frontier
In a second model, we assume perfect best policy practice diusion by moving to the frontier. That is, we assume that every country i in the set of full countries C achieves at 6 least as good of a development outcome I as every country that is poorer than i. 4 This implies that the model is likely to be particularly sensitive to measurement error. Any forecasts of the frontier in 2030 are therefore likely to be over-optimistic. Note also that the policy frontier at a particular level of income may be driven by a range of factors apart from the use of the most ecient technologies and may include geographic and demographic factors that improve outcomes at a given level of income (tropical climate of population density, for example), norms, culture and institutional dierences that impact the eciency of spending, spending priorities, and outside assistance, as well as stocks of human and physical capital.
To project future progress, we estimate two distinct scenarios. In the rst, the frontier is stable: countries grow at the assumed 7 percent rate and move to the frontier F (e) where e is the most recent year y with available data. In the second, we estimate a shifting frontier assuming continued progress based on the rates for the time period between s and e. Unlike in the Preston curve projections, we do not conduct the analyses using xed samples.
We assume that any country with missing data in period s would not be the frontier country for its income. The projected frontier for a given income Y is dened according to equation
4. This specication estimates the change in a given indicator over period (s, e) to future year y assuming that for a given income Y , the historical progress can be linearly projected.
Due to country growth, however, for certain segements of the distribution of Y , F I,s > F I,e despite an overall improvement in that indicator. We thus restrict the projected frontier to be at least as good as the frontiers F I,s and F I,e though we do not force this to be true for all years y ∈ (s, e). Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation, and number of countries for each indicator in the end year of the shift period.
Projection Estimates
We begin by documenting the historical evolution of the relationship between GDP per capita and these key development indicators. Figure 4 shows how the intercept α and coecient β have evolved over time for under-ve mortality. There seem to be two major changes in the rate of change in Preston curve shifts: rst between the 1960s and 1970s, and second at the turn the millennium. In particular, the intercept has began falling while the slope is increasingly less negative for the past two decades or so. Figure 5 shows the Preston curves for the relevant domains and ranges for under-ve mortality in ve-year increments since 1960. Second, including the residuals matters much more than adopting a shifting model. To the extent that these residuals capture country xed eects, these results highlight the need for policymakers to focus on country-specic actions in order to achieve the SDGs. Third, perhaps obviously, the technological frontier projections are signicantly more positive than , table 4 documents the technological demand needed to meet each of these targets and the number of countries that fail to meet the SDG goal. Table 3 Figure 13 graphically displays this demand for two of the Preston curve specications:
constant and shifting Preston curves, both of which include residuals. A striking takeaway from these gures is that incorporating the technological shifts in the Preston curve does not necessarily lead to more progressive results in the case of maternal mortality, depending on a country's place along the income distribution. Figure 17 shows the maternal mortality
Preston curves for 1990 and 2015 and highlights this danger of considering estimates from a shifting Preston curve model. Depending on the relative rate of improvement between poor countries and rich countries, the Preston curve at higher incomes can in fact fall over time due simply to the rapid progress made in the developing world. 
Conclusion
While our results are simply modeling exercises without a true counterfactual, the estimates do give a sense of the feasibility of these targets. These targets are unlikely to be met without signicant and unprecedentedly ubiquitous technology and policy change alongside very rapid economic growth. That said, considerable progress is possible both by driving technological change that reduces the nancial and institutional burden of achieving development outcomes as well as by moving towards best practice in terms of outcomes achieved at a given level of income and global technology availability. If the SDG process encourages that progress, it will have been a success even If specic targets are missed. 
Maternal Mortality Rate Preston Curves
Note: Figure 17 highlights the Preston curves between 1990 and 2015 of the maternal mortality rate.
